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"Body Property":

Challenging the Ethical Barriers in Organ
Transplantation to Protect Individual Autonomy
Charles C. Dunham IV*
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body ....

-

Justice

Benjamin Cardozo

I.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history the human body has been cherished in family and
friendships, admired in art and literature, honored in scholastics and
competition, and subjugated in slavery and war. The value of the human
body is distinct in each context.
As the progressive field of biotechnology' promises advancements in
human health, it produces new ways of valuing the human body. While the
organs and tissues of the human body have a recognized intrinsic worth, the
advancements in medical transplant technology continue to redefine this
value. Today, the transplantation of a kidney or heart in a dying patient can
mean the promise of prolonged life. Unfortunately, not every person who
needs an organ transplant will receive one. According to the United
Network for Organ Sharing, as of October 24, 2007, there were 97,910
patients waiting for transplants, and only 14,225 organs donated.2 Until
. As a Juris Doctor Candidate at Albany Law School, I have concentrated my degree on
legal issues in the health care industry. This comment addresses one of the relevant and
timely topics facing both our medical and legal communities. In recognition of the support
and assistance provided to me in reaching this stage, I wish to thank Professor Alicia
Ouellette at Albany Law School, the law firm of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., the entire
staff of the Annals of Health Law of Loyola University Chicago School of Law, and my
family and friends. Thank you all.
1. "[T]he manipulation (as through genetic engineering) of living organisms to produce
useful products." THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 49 (1 1 1hed. 2005).
2. United Network for Organ Sharing, http://www.unos.org/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
However, America still has the second highest rate of donors in the world. Spain has the
world's highest rate at 35 donors per million, the United States has 21 per million, and
Australia has 10 per million. Kelly Andrew, Organ Donor Rate Falls to Record Low,
SOUTHLAND TIMES (N.Z.), Jan. 8, 2007.
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recently, the legislative solution had been to advance funding for
organizations and marketing directed at motivating the public to become
organ donors. 3 However, the simple truth is that altruism is not a motivator
sufficient to produce the number of organ donors necessary to keep pace
with the ever increasing number of recipients, many of whom will die while
waiting. Consequently, this disparity between organ donors and recipients
has become a national concern. Thus, federal and state governments are
considering alternatives, such as "mandated choice," forcing everyone to
choose whether or not they want to be a donor, or "presumed consent,"
assuming everyone wants to be a donor unless they indicate otherwise.4
These initiatives, however, are criticized for the ethical drawbacks
pertaining to the loss of autonomy and the right to choose; therefore, they
arguably violate constitutional rights of due process and freedom of
religion.5
An alternative proposal permits "direct economic payments."6 Under
this proposal, two approaches exist: (1) to offer indirect financial incentives
to the potential donor and their family or (2) to create a commercial market
for organs. The law and ethics of organ procurement permit the first
approach which allows states to offer potential donors and their families
"valuable consideration" in exchange for the organ donation.8 Proponents
of this approach often seek to distinguish it from a market-based approach
by arguing that the compensation is public, not private, and thus, represents
the appreciation of the entire community rather than the product of a private
contract between parties for the sale of a good. 9 Furthermore, economic
payment advocates oppose opening the door to a market-based approach
because it would require a significant expansion of the scope of human
3. See S. REP. No. 98-382 (1984) (discussing the National Organ Transplant Act, 42
U.S.C. § 201, April 6, 1984). The federal legislature recently approved $23,282,000 in
funding; signed into law by President Bush on Dec. 30, 2006.
4. Kieran Healy, Do Presumed-Consent Laws Raise Organ Procurement Rates?, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 1017, 1018 (2006); Denise Spellman, Encouragement is Not Enough: The
Benefits of Initiatinga Mandated Choice Organ ProcurementSystem, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV.
353, 371 (2006). Courts in Florida, Georgia, and Michigan have upheld the constitutionality
of cornea removal statutes under presumed consent. See State v. Powell, 497 So.2d 1188,
1193-94 (Fla. 1986); Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ga.
1985); Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
5. Vanessa Chandis, Addressing A Dire Situation: A Multi-Faceted Approach to the
Kidney Shortage, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 205, 248, 263 (2006).
6. David 1. Flamholz, A Penny For Your Organs: Revising New York's Policy On
Offering FinancialIncentives For Organ Donation, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 329, 354-55 (2006).
7. Id. at 332.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2000).
9. President's Council on Bioethics, Organ Transplantation: Ethical Dilemmas and
Policy Choices (January 2003), http://www.bioethics.gov/background/org-transplant.html
(last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
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body property rights.' ° The notion of the body as property (or the
commodification of the body) raises ethical concerns and challenges the
moral integrity and dignity of the body.'"
Currently, federal and state statutes specifically forbid the sale of human
organs.'2 However, courts have recognized this limitation on the
disposition of human organs as a reflection of public health concerns, rather3
than a legislative policy against a property interest in the body.'
Specifically, organs for transplantation are regulated "as a scarce national
resource allocated to balance medical utility with equity in a formulation
designed to avoid wastage and maximize the life saving potential of each
donation."' 4 Nevertheless, the extent to which the government can
encourage the development of incentive systems for organ donors will be
limited by the extent that the legislature recognizes a possessory right, or
property right, in organs.' 5
This comment will discuss the need to reconstruct organ transplantation
legislation to recognize organs and tissues separated from the body as a
distinct category of personal property. Section I will also address the
removal of prohibitions on the sale of non-vital and cadaveric organs in
order to resolve the current organ shortage and protect the interests of the
decedent and donor. Section II will discuss the legislative history of organ
procurement and allocation in America and the psychological barriers to
donor consent that have weakened the system and caused a universal
shortage of organs for transplantation. Section III will present discourse on
the human body as property and the importance of separating the lifetime
rights of ownership in our own bodies from post-mortem rights. This
10. Id.
11. Arthur L. Caplan, C.T. Van Buren & N.L. Tilney, Financial Compensation for
Cadaver Organ Donation: Good Idea or Anathema?, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION 219,222 (Arthur L. Caplan ed., 1998). "Calls for markets, compensation,
bounties, or rewards should be rejected because they pose risks to personal autonomy and
fairness. They convert donor into sources, human beings into products, thus undermining
the foundational values requisite for respect for others and for self-esteem." Id. at 223.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 5-408 (LexisNexis 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.10204 (West
2001); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4307 (McKinney Supp. 2007).
13. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990); Moore v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). These concerns are later
addressed by this note, but are important to be familiar with when comparing the courts' and
legislatures' reasoning for denying a property interest in the human body.
14. Brief for N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 6, Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 860 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y.
2006), available at http://www.unos.org/SharedContentDocuments/Colavito-AmicusBrief
_andMotion-_.AsFiled.pdf.
15. Alicia M. Markmann, Organ Donation: IncreasingDonations While Honoring Our
Longstanding Values, 24 TEMP. J. Sci. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 499, 501 (2005).
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section will also review case law in America upholding the majority view
on limited property rights in the body and focus on a recent New York
Court of Appeals decision concerning property rights in donated, cadaveric
organs. This review will illustrate why the legislative branch, rather than
the judicial branch, will need to make a distinction between lifetime and
post-mortem rights and recognize a broadened property interest in cadaveric
organs to promote organ procurement. Section IV will argue that following
the expansion of property rights in the human body, the legislature needs to
remove the ban on the sale of non-vital and cadaveric organs for
transplantation to resolve the national crisis facing organ procurement for
transplantation. Then this section will propose that a regulated "Futures
Market"' 16 approach would be the most consistent with the current law and
ethics. Finally, Section V will discuss the interplay between the legal and
ethical implications surrounding the concept of a market-based approach.
These legal and ethical implications must be respected for a market-based
approach to successfully address the organ shortage crisis.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION IN AMERICA

A. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA)
The first successful long-term transplant of a human kidney occurred in
1954.17 As surgeons continued to have success with the transplantation of
18
other organs, the public recognized a new value in the human body.
However, obtaining an adequate supply of organs to cover the new demand
proved difficult. This necessitated establishing laws and regulations to
recognize a legal right of the living donors, and the next of kin, to convey
the organ(s) of the decedent.
After years of debate, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA") to provide states with a model
law to outline who may execute anatomical gifts,' 9 the rights and duties of
16. See Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a Futures
Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1994).
17. Joseph E. Murray, John P. Merrill & J. Hartwell Harrison, Renal
Hemotransplantationin Identical Twins, 6 SURGICAL F. 432, 432-35 (1956).
18. Robert M. Veatch, Professor, Medical Ethics, Georgetown University, Address at
Union University Bioethics Proseminar (August 2006). In 1962, first successful cadaveric
(deceased) kidney transplant; 1967, first successful liver transplant; 1968, first successful
heart transplant; 1983, first successful lung transplant. See Timeline of Key Events in U.S.
Transplantation and UNOS History, http://www.UNOS.org/whoweare/history.asp (last
visited Nov. 18, 2007).
19. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 9 (revised 2006), 8A U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2007). The
priority of classes that may authorize the gift of all or part of the human body after death for
specified purpose are (1) agent of the decent at the time of death who could have made an
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the donee, 20 and who can become a donee. 2 1 By 1973, all 50 states22 and the

District of Columbia had adopted the UAGA or a variation thereof.
The UAGA expresses a patient's right to designate, prior to removal, the
postmortem use of a body part. 23 The UAGA also designates the same
authority to the next of kin when the individual had not indicated his desire
during his lifetime.24 Furthermore, the UAGA specifically prohibits the
sale of organs. 25 Nonetheless, commentators have suggested that Congress
recognized "the altruistic model of organ donation" and that "until the issue
of payment becomes a problem of some dimensions, the matter should be
left to the decency of intelligent human beings. 26 The government must
have believed that the demand could be met by granting a limited property
interest in one's own body to execute an anatomical gift upon their death.
Unfortunately, the shortfall in supply became a significant problem in the
early eighties as concerns emerged over reports of an existing black market
in human organs.2 7
B. National Organ TransplantationAct (NOTA)
In response, Congress enacted the National Organ Transplantation Act
("NOTA") which rendered it unlawful to "knowingly acquire, receive, or
otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in
human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce. 2 8 NOTA
anatomical gift immediately before the decedent's death; (2) spouse; (3) an adult son or
daughter; (4) either parent; (5) an adult brother or sister; (6) adult grandchildren of the
decedent; (7) grandparents of the decedent; (8) an adult who exhibited special care and
concern for the decedent; (9) the persons who were acting as the [guardians] of the person of
the decedent at the time of death; and (10) any other person having the authority to dispose
of the decedent's body. Id.
20. Id. § ll.
21. Id.
22. Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REv. 971, 1022 (1999).
23.

UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 4-5 (revised 2006), 8A U.L.A. 12-14 (Supp. 2007).

24. Id. § 9.
25. Id. § 16.
26. Markmann, supra note 15, at 505 (quoting Shelby E. Robinson, Organsfor Sale? An
Analysis of Proposed Systems for Compensating Organ Providers, 70 U. COLO. L. REv.
1019, 1026 n.57 (1999)).
27. See ARTHUR L. CAPLAN ET AL., THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: THE CURRENT
DEBATE 235 (Daniel H. Coelho & Arthur L. Caplan eds., Prometheus Books 1998).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000). "Before the passage of the NOTA, a few states
prohibited the sale of human organs and bodies after death. See, e.g., Law of Aug. 1, 1968,
ch. 429, § 7, 56 Del. Laws 1773, 1773 (1967) (repealed 1970) (prohibiting the sale of bodies
and body parts after death); Law of May 20, 1967, ch. 94, § 1, 1967 Hawaii Laws 91, 91
(repealed 1969) (prohibiting the sale of bodies after death); Law of April 24, 1961, ch. 315, §
1, 1961 Md. Laws 397, 398 (repealed 1968) (prohibiting the sale of bodies, body tissues, or
organs after death); Act of June 12, 1967, ch. 353, 1967 Mass. Acts 202, 202 (repealed 1971)
(prohibiting the sale of bodies, body tissues, or organs after death); Law of April 22, 1964,
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also sought to address the shortage of organ donors by establishing a task
force to "conduct comprehensive examinations of the medical, legal,
ethical, economic, and social issues presented by human organ procurement
and transplantation., 29 The task force provided recommendations based on
its studies to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS").
HHS then solicited proposals for the operation of the Organ Procurement
and Transplantation Network ("OPTN"), which was established under
NOTA. 30 Today, organs for transplantation in the United States are
procured and allocated through a national system
designed and
3
administered by the OPTN pursuant to federal statute. 1
The OPTN establishes the process and policies for allocating organs
through the federal contractor that operates the network, the United
Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS"). 32 UNOS creates computerized
algorithms pursuant to principles stipulated by federal regulations that take
into account clinical factors such as blood type, tissue type, medical
urgency, geographic location (in some cases), physical size of the donor,
and potential recipient (for some 33organs), as well as equity factors such as
the time spent waiting on the list.

NOTA also provided the Secretary of the HHS with the power to make
grants to private Organ Procurement Operations ("OPOs") that were
already committed to educating and motivating the public to donate their
organs or the organs of decedents.3 4 Currently, coordinators from 58
federally-designated, non-profit OPOs are responsible for recovering organs
for transplantation from deceased patients in the United States.35 The OPO
coordinators' process of obtaining consent for donation varies slightly by
state and OPO practice, but it is guided by the UAGA.36
Yet, even with this entire network formulated to increase public
ch. 702, § 1, 1964 N.Y. Laws 1827, 1828 (repealed 1971) (prohibiting the sale of eyes, body

parts, or bodies after death)." Susan Hankin Denise, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs,
71 VA. L. REv. 1015, 1022 (1985).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1)(A) (2000).
30. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, History, http://www.optn.org/
optn/history.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. United Network for Organ Sharing, http://www.unos.orglinthenews/factsheets.asp?fs=l
(last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (describing the computerized network system and utilizing
recipient characteristics).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 273(a)(1) (2000). Authorized to be appropriated: $5 million for fiscal
year 1985; $8 million for fiscal year 1986; and $12 million for fiscal year 1987. 42 U.S.C. §
273(c) (2000).
35. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, http://www.optn.org/members/
(last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
36. See id.
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donation, the problem of organ shortage continues. 37 Currently, the U.S.
still tries to procure transplant organs by merely urging people to register as
organ donors.38 A recent report by the Institute of Medicine ("IOM") on the
severe shortage of transplant organs proposed "more of the same medicine,"
suggesting that coordinators simply need to ask more ardently. 39 However,
activists argue that "continuing this policy, no matter how fervently we
solicit would-be donors, will only fail to prevent more unnecessary deaths
and more reports on the chronic organ shortage. 4 °
C. Understandingthe ContinuedShortage
Theorists have suggested a multitude of reasons to explain the barriers to
obtaining donor consent, such as cultural and religious views, lack of
motivation, distrust of the medical community, the perceived inequities in
organ distribution, and, of course, the reluctance to face death. 41 These
reasons are not unique to American culture, but also pose barriers in
countries imposing mandatory-choice or presumed consent initiatives.42
Further analysis suggests that removing prohibitions on the sale of
cadaveric organs can potentially circumvent these issues to increase the
procurement of organs.
1. Cultural and Religious Perspective
Beliefs about the body are often formed through religious tradition.
37. See United Network for Organ Sharing, http://www.unos.org/ (last visited Nov. 18,
2007).
38. David E. Harrington & Edward A. Sayre, Buying Bodies, Stealing Organs?,
Washingtonpost.com, Nov. 27, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/ll/26/AR2006112600820.html.
In 2001, Health and Human
Services Secretary Tommy Thompson announced a broad initiative to boost transplants,
including a model organ donor card and new efforts to sign up donors at U.S. workplaces.
Online NewsHour: Organ & Tissue Donation (April 17, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/jan-june01/organdonor.html (last visited Nov. 18,
2007)).
39. Harrington & Sayre, supra note 38.
40. Id.
41. See Chandis, supra note 5, at 210-12. See also Daniel T. Stimson, Private
Solicitation of Organ Donors: A Threat to the Fairness of the U.S. Organ Transplantation
System, or A Solution to the National Organ Shortage?, 10 MICH. ST. U. J.MED, & L. 349,
364-65 (2006).
42. Financial compensation in exchange for live kidney donation is prohibited in
Canada. However, patients in Canada with end-stage renal disease and without a suitable
biologically or emotionally related live donor face substantial waiting times on lists for
deceased donor kidneys, and so may therefore choose to acquire organs from a live donor in
a procedure performed outside Canada as part of a commercial transaction. G.V. Ramesh
Prasad, Outcomes of Commercial Renal Transplantation: A Canadian Experience, 82
TRANSPLANTATION 1130, 1130 (2006).
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Some religious texts and teachings regard the body as intact, in some form,
after death.43 Nevertheless, almost all religious traditions support the gift of
an organ when it will make the difference between life and death.44
However, most religious followers believe it is against their religion to
donate their organs, or the organs of their loved ones, upon death.4 5 This
ignorance has become a barrier to obtaining consent, as most potential
donors, or their next of kin, are unwilling to donate based on their faith.4 6
The philosophical underpinnings of the current restrictive policies seem
closely related to the religious and cultural perspectives on the issue of
organ procurement. Commentators argue that commodifying the human
body would violate religious and cultural perspectives of how the body
should be respected in our society.47 Robert Veatch notes: "The body is
affirmed to be a central part of the total spiritual being. Any scheme that
abandons the mode of donation in favor of viewing the cadaver as a social
resource to be mined for worthwhile social purposes will directly violate
central tenets of [religious] thought. 4 8 Nevertheless, these perspectives
should not preclude the government from removing such prohibitions on
the sale of organs. Religious intolerance and misconception, which already
pose barriers to the current altruistic system, cannot direct public health.
2. Lack of Motivation
Currently, the system of organ donation expressly forbids the offer of
direct "valuable consideration" for a human organ. The government and
most of the public believe that human body parts should not be viewed as
commodities and individuals or organizations should not profit by the sale
of human organs for transplantation.49
However, theorists and economists suggest that this altruistic model does
not provide sufficient motivation for organ donation. 50 They have proffered
that monetary payments would create the incentives necessary to increase
the supply of organs for transplantation. 5'
While this may be the
unfortunate reality of our capitalistic society, it is true that for the past forty

43.

ROBERT M. VEATCH, TRANSPLANTATION ETHICS 13 (Georgetown University Press

2000).
44. See The Gift of a Lifetime: Religion and Organ and Tissue Donation,
http://www.organtransplants.org/understanding/religion/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
45.
46.
47.

VEATCH,

supra note 43, at 13.

See id.
Id.

48. Id.
49.
50.

See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 16 (revised 2006), 8A U.L.A. 30 (Supp. 2007).
See Flamholz, supra note 6, at 335.

51.

Id. at 352.
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years there has been a shortage of organ donors. A market-based approach
would permit the buying and selling of human organs and tissue for
financial gain, which theorists and economists project would motivate the
public to increase the number of willing donors.52
3. Distrust of the Medical Community
The public distrust for the medical community is a notion that cannot be
denied. The horrible vestiges of slavery, segregation, and racism continue
to provide a disturbing context for the delivery of health care to
minorities. 53 While theorists debate whether or not minority groups are
unequally represented as organ donors, the remnants of these inequities
have been offered to account for the statistical fact that minority groups are
largely unrepresented as organ donors. 4
However, irrespective of race or status, there exists a general distrust that
an organ donor's wishes will not be respected at the critical hour.5 5 The
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 requires hospitals accepting Medicare
and Medicaid to "discuss organ donation with families of deceased patients
who were potential donors., 5 6 However, "[t]hese laws had an unexpected
repercussion. By requiring doctors to always ask for familial consent to
donate, these laws undermined the authority of donor cards, as well as the
idea of patient autonomy," because the next of kin would sometimes refuse
to grant the physician consent in spite of the decedent's express wish. 7
Since then, "doctors and hospitals have overwhelmingly insisted on
honoring the wishes of the living family, even when it means ignoring the
decedent's wishes., 58 While concern for the wishes of the living family is
reasonable, it ignores the express wishes of the patient. Therefore,
recognizing the supremacy of a donor's (testator) right to "vest" their
52.
See Andy H. Barnett, Roger D. Blair, & David L. Kaserman, Selling Organs For
Transplants is Ethical, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 52, 53 (Tamara L

Roleffed., Gale Group 1998).
53. See Patricia A. King, Reflections on Race and Bioethics in the United States, 14
HEALTH MATRIX 149, 153 (2004).
54. Vernellia R. Randall, Slavery, Segregation and Racism: Trusting the Health Care

System Ain't Always Easy! An African-American Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REv. 191, 219-20 (1996) (arguing blacks donate less and have less access to the
organs). Organ Transplantation, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1519, 1626 (1990) (arguing that blacks
donate at a rate equal to whites, and simply need more kidneys).
55. Ann C. Klassen & David K. Klassen, Who Are the Donors in Organ Donation?: The
Family's Perspectivein Mandated Choice, 125 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 1, 71-73 (1996).
56. Ben Berkman, Organ Donor Card Effectiveness, AMA (VIRTUAL MENTOR) CASE IN
HEALTH

LAW,

(August

2002),

http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8560.html;

Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8 (2000).
57. Berkman, supra note 56.
58. Id.
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organs could deter the next of kin from contesting a decedent's designation.
Further, a market-based approach would properly record the decedent's
wishes under contract and protect him from third-party interference.
The way to change the public mindset is to change the system. The
prohibition against buying and selling organs expresses clear legislative
intent that the transfer of organs from donors to recipients is outside of the
traditional legal principles of contract and property law. 59 However, if our
estate, body, or personal property were distributed after our death without
adherence to our personal wishes, most individuals would find this
unacceptable. An advantage that all forward-looking approaches share is
that the autonomy of the individual is maximized. In the case of a
commercial market in organs, the legal principles of contract and property
law would apply and provide the decedent's estate standing upon which to
enforce the decedent's personal wishes upon his or her death.
4. Inequities in Organ Distribution
The current organ distribution scheme limits accessibility based on
determinations of how to equitably allocate organs among those in need.60
Such disparate factors include "biological compatibility between donor and
donee, age of donee, gravity of donee's medical condition, geographical
6
location of donor and donee, and time donee has spent on a waiting list." '
These factors limit access for countless patients in need of an organ
transplant.
However, there are multiple underlying limitations to the current organ
distribution scheme. For instance, before candidates are even placed on the
national waiting list, they must first prove that they have the funds to pay
for the transplant, either through state assistance or insurance.62 Secondly,
minority groups have historically received inferior treatment as compared to
whites. 63 Even though no race information is specified on the national
transplant waiting list, the perception remains that donated organs will be

59. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 860 N.E.2d 713, 716-19 (N.Y. 2006).
60. United Network for Organ Sharing, http://www.unos.org/inthenews/factsheets.asp?fs=l
(last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (discussing how the transplant system works in matching donors
and recipients).
61. See Melissa A.W. Stickney, Property Interests in Cadaverous Organs: Changes to
Ohio Anatomical Gift Law and the Erosion of Family Rights, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 37, 38
(2002) (citing Roderick T. Chen, Organ Allocation and the States: Can the States Restrict
Broader Organ Sharing?49 Duke L.J. 261, 266 (1999)).
62. Stimson, supra note 41, at 364.
63. See Sana Halwani, Racial Inequality in Access to Health Care Services, ONTARIO
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/issues/

racism/racepolicydialogue/sh/pdf.
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given to whites.64 Lastly, public reports of physicians altering a patient's
condition reports to place the patient at a higher-status on the national
waiting list, 65 or celebrities receiving favorable considerations over other
waiting recipients,66 have created a negative stereotype of inequality in the
allocation process.
If the public does not trust that the distribution of this scarce commodity
is fair, individuals become less likely to register as donors. There is no
question that a market-based approach to organ procurement would be
affected by the natural inequalities of purchase power in the market.
However, even health care has historically been inaccessible to many
people based upon a person's economic, racial, and social status. The
current government is certainly not willing to promote equal access for
basic health care needs, so why should this be a limitation in the present
case?
III. THE HUMAN BODY AS PROPERTY

Given the multitude of factors inhibiting organ donation, it is not
surprising that the need to rethink the current legislation on organ
procurement is a highly publicized and politicized topic on an international
scale. Indeed, it is crucial to the public health that the government comes to
a resolution. This comment takes the position that the shortage will not be
curtailed until an expansion of property rights in the human body is
recognized and the government removes the prohibitions on the sale of
cadaveric organs and tissues.
In the article "She's Got Bette Davis's Eyes," author Erik S. Jaffe
categorizes four groups of substantive rights existing relative to the body:
"(1) common-law rights involving burials and autopsies; (2) modem
statutory rights concerning the dead body, most notably the UAGA and its
variations; (3) rights involving parts of the body that are no longer
connected to the whole body; and (4) rights concerning living bodies. 67
64. An investigation by the New York Daily News discovered that 75 percent of patients
from the New York City area referred for organ transplantation, between 1996 and 1998,
Michele Goodwin, Altruism's Limits:
were white.
Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 332-35 (2004).

Law,

Capacity, and Organ

65. Press Release, N.Y. State Dep't of Health, State Health Department Fines Albany
Medical Center (May 28, 2004), available at http://www.health.state.ny.us/press/releases
/2004/albany_medicalcenterrelease_05_28_2004.htm.
66. Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor's World; Defending Tough Decisions In a Case
Open to Hindsight, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=990CE3DE 1F39F936A2575BCOA963958260.
67. Erik S. Jaffe, She's Got Bette Davis['s]Eyes: Assessing the NonconsensualRemoval
of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528,
543 (1990) (presenting an argument that the body is property to ensure protection under the
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Jaffe argues, "[s]ince property rights are viewed as surviving the death of
their owner, a corollary to this seems to be that any such rights in a dead
body also exist prior to death, though perhaps in a somewhat modified
form.' '68 This concept is particularly important to establishing the
individual's right to contract for the sale of his body upon death, and
therefore, will be the focus of this section. In addition, this section will
demonstrate why courtrooms are not the proper forum for the proposed
policy change.
A. PropertyRights in the Body of a DeceasedPerson
The common law on this subject extends back for centuries. The
development of American common law defining property rights in the
human body progressed from the earlier English common law which held
that there was no property right in a dead body. 69 However, American case
law eventually deviated from this idea:
[A]s cases involving unauthorized mutilation and disposition of bodies
increased toward the end of the 1 9 th century, paralleling the rise in
demand for human cadavers in medical science... courts began to
recognize an exclusive right of the next of kin to possess and control the
disposition of the bod[y] .... '7
This right, referred to as a "quasi-property right," belongs to the spouse or
next of kin to prevent mutilation or damage to the body and it allows the
next of kin to possess the body in order to guarantee proper burial. 1
However, this merely asserts a protected "negative right" to be free from
interference with possession of the decedent's body, rather than a "positive
right" of ownership to demand possession of the body.72 While many
courts confronted with the issue of whether a property interest can exist in a
dead body have found that a property right of some kind does exist, the

due process and takings clause of the U.S. Constitution).
68. Id. at 545 n.82.
69. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing to Williams
v. Williams, (1882) 20 Ch.D. 659, 665 (U.K.)).
70. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 223 (2d. Cir. 2006)
(citing Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2002)).
71. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 356 F.Supp.2d 237, 243-44 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (opinion affirmed in Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214 (2d.
Cir. 2006)).
72. See Stanley E. Cox, Government As Arbiter, Not Custodian: Relational Privacy As
FoundationForA Right To Refuse Medical Treatment ProlongingIncompetents' Lives, 18
N.M. L. REv. 131, 141 (1988).
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same courts refuse to recognize an absolute property right to the body, in
life or death.73
B. Property Rights in the Living Body
Historically, the rights in a living body have been viewed as a liberty
interest, and not as property.74 This is an important distinction when
arguing in favor of recognizing a property interest in the body after death
because one must provide "an explanation that accounts for the existence of
both liberty and property interests in a live body.., to reconcile the change
in the legal treatment of the body at death., 75 This liberty, or ownership,
interest includes the rights to use, posses and "exclude others from one's
body while one is alive. 76 This interest is protected under substantive due
process.77

This liberty interest in the living body is demonstrated in several ways.
The right to possess one's own body is historically recognized in the
prohibition against slavery 78 and false imprisonment penalties. 79 Personal
employment contracts illustrate the right to use the body. 80 The right to
exclude others is evident in civil and criminal penalties for assault and
battery. 8' These rights bear a great deal of resemblance to the rights
associated with a property interest under the common law definition of
property.
The legal definition of property most often refers not to a particular
physical object, but rather to the legal bundle of rights recognized in that
object.8 3 This "bundle of rights" includes the rights to possess, use,
exclude, sell, and dispose.84 Those opposed to recognizing the living body
as property argue "that there is no general right to sell the body, and

73. See, e.g., Ga. Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (1985); In re Donn, 14
N.Y.S. 189 (1891).
74. Jaffe, supra note 67, at 553.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 545.
77. Id. at 543, 547.
78. Id. at 545-46. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
79. Jaffe, supra note 67, at 545-46. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2 (1962)
(felonious restraint); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 35-42 (1965) (false
imprisonment).
80. Jaffe, supra note 67, at 546.
81.
Id. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1) (assault); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 13 (1965) (battery).

82. Jaffe, supra note 67, at 549-50.
83. Id. at 548.
84. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36
(1982).
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therefore, it lacks an essential attribute of property., 85 While a person need
not possess all of the rights relative to any given object in order to have
property rights, opponents argue that the right to sell is so important to
recognizing a property interest that its exclusion is sufficient to deny a
property label.86 However, such a limitation under common law will not
necessarily deny the recognition of an underlying property interest. The
case of Andrus v. Allard concerned the state's ban on the sale of eagle
feathers. 87 The Supreme Court noted, "the destruction of one 'strand' of
the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety. ' 88 Hence, even though the right to sell the property was taken
away, the appellant maintained the rights to possess, use, and dispose. 89
Therefore, the reasonable expectation that the body is subject to the
exclusive control of the individual, or their next of kin, may serve as a basis
for calling the body property. This supports the assumption that while there
are practical limitations on the sale of the living body (or its components)
due to public health concerns over the promotion of life, there still remains
a vested property interest in the individual's body that does not cease upon
removal or upon death, and should then be transferable upon death.
Nonetheless, the majority of courts have not held this view.
C. The Human Body as Property in American Case Law
Presently, the majority of courts uphold the common law limits on the
property rights that exist in the body of the dead and refuse to identify or
forecast the implications of a contrary decision under modem
circumstances. 90 In the benchmark case, Moore v. Regents of the
University of California,the Supreme Court of California was faced with a
claim for conversion of bodily matter (unique cancerous cells) wrongly
acquired under false pretense by the plaintiffs physician who used the cellline for his own lucrative research. 9 1 In analyzing this case, the California
Appellate Court held that the "crux" of the claim for conversion rested on
whether the tissue of a living person was a form of tangible personal

85. Jaffe, supra note 67, at 551.
86. Id. See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a (1979). "This [right of control]
does not, however, fit well into the category of property since the body cannot ordinarily be
sold or transferred, has no utility, and can be used only for the one purpose of internment or
cremation."
87. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 54 (1979).
88. Id. at 65-66.
89. Id. at 66. "It is crucial that appellees retain the rights to possess and transport their
property, and to donate or devise the protected birds." Id.
90. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 860 N.E.2d 713, 719 (N.Y. 2006).
91. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 479 (Cal. 1990).
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property. 92 The court noted that "no public policy has ever been articulated,
nor is there any statutory authority, against a property interest in one's own
body., 93 Furthermore, the court held that "even though the rights and
interests one has over one's own body may be subject to important
limitations because of public health concerns, the absence of unlimited or
unrestricted dominion and control does not negate the existence of a
property right for the purpose of a conversion action. 94 Nevertheless, the
California Supreme Court refused to recognize an absolute right in the
human body, denying the claim for conversion by pointing to the public
policy implications of allowing a patient to retain a property right in a body
part after removal from the body.95 The policy consideration balanced in
favor of refusing to recognize the plaintiff's ownership rights in his own
cells was the fear that the establishment of such rights would hinder the free
exchange of human biological materials and inhibit the advancement of the
biotechnology industry, which the court saw as "crucial to the future of
health care."9 6

Unfortunately, the Moore case has been seen merely as an extension of
case precedent on limited property interests in the human body 97 by which
the majority of courts refuse to grant full property rights in the body. 98
However, some courts have been willing to rethink the holding in Moore,99
92. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
93. Id. at 504.
94. Id. at 506-07.
95. Moore, 793 P.2d at 492. Ironically, the court held "[a] patient must have the
ultimate power to control what becomes of his or her tissues," and therefore, recognized the
plaintiffs claim that the acquisition and use of his cells, tissue, and other bodily substances
was a breach of fiduciary duties on the part of his physician. Id.at 491.
96. E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 50 (Georgetown Univ. Press 1996).

97. See Holsen v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 478 N.W.2d 59 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (stating
that there is no property interest in a cadaver); Ramirez v. Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972
P.2d 658, 667 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the common law claim for negligent
interference with a dead body does not extend to the organ donation context).
98. See, e.g., Shults v. United States, 995 F. Supp. 1270, 1275-76 (D. Kan. 1998)
(parents of deceased airman had no claim of conversion where portion's of son's tissues and
organs were discarded after autopsy); Hasselbach v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 159 N.Y.S. 376, 376
(N.Y. App. Div. 1916) (widow could not sustain conversion claim for unauthorized autopsy
performed on husband).

99. Maryland district court held that cell lines are indeed property, recognizing the claim
of conversion for the misappropriation of those human tissue lines. United States v. Arora,
860 F. Supp. 1091, 1099 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd, 56 F.3d'62 (4th Cir. 1995). California court
granted the decedent a property interest in sperm for the purpose of inheritance. Hecht v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 275, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
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especially in the area of post-mortem property rights in the body. l00 In
particular, the Ninth Circuit, in Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, recognized
that a property interest in the body of a deceased child had vested in his
parents, giving them the "exclusive and legitimate claims of entitlement to
possess, control, dispose and prevent the violation of the [body] .... 10'
D. Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network
Nevertheless, even as scientific advances lead to increased use of and
demand for human organs, and the body continues to take on the functional
characteristics of property, 0 2 the majority of courts refuse to overturn
10 3
traditional notions of a limited property interest in the human body.
Recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified to the New York
Court of Appeals the question of whether a property right of the donor, or
next of kin, exists in regards to a cadaveric organ donated for
transplantation. 10 4 The case Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network,
Inc. ("NYODN") concerned the misappropriation and transplantation of a
donor kidney into a recipient not indicated in the "directed donation."' 0 5
The Second Circuit recognized the controversy surrounding this issue and
the potential implications this decision could have on public policy in the
policy
State of New York, and therefore, held that the state's current public
06
was a more proper determination than common-law principles.
When, in August 2002, Peter Lucia died of intra-cranial bleeding, his
widow and her sons decided to donate both of his kidneys to his friend,
Robert Colavito. 107 Defendant Spencer Hertzel, an NYODN official,
assisted Debra Lucia in filling out an organ-donor form. 10 8 At that time,
Lucia told Hertzel that the kidneys were a "directed donation" specifically

100.

See, e.g., Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 796 (9th Cir. 2002)

(granting parents exclusive and legitimate claims of entitlement to possess, control, dispose
and prevent the violation of the body of their deceased child). But see Georgia Lions Eye
Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985) (finding no constitutionally protected

right vested in a decedent's body); State v. Powell, 497 So.2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986)
(upholding the constitutionality of legislation authorizing medical examiners to remove
comeas without the consent of the next of kin for public health interests).
101. Newman, 287 F.3d at 796-97.
102. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 10 (Little Brown and
Co. 1974) (1972).

103.
104.
2006).
105.
106.
107.
108.

See Moore, 793 P.2d at 487.
See Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 860 N.E.2d 713, 719 (N.Y.
Id. at 715.
Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 216-17 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 216.
Id. at 217.
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for Colavito.'0 9 While awaiting implantation of the first kidney, the
attending surgeon, Dr. George W. Burke, discovered that the kidney had
been damaged by aneurysms. 110 Therefore, a staff member called to request
However, the
the second kidney be air-lifted for transplantation."'
NYODN representative informed the party that the second kidney had
already been implanted in another recipient; as it turned out, the kidney was
not transplanted until three days later. 1 2 Subsequently, Colavito filed a
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
Public Health
York alleging conversion, fraud, and violations of New York
3
1
donation)."
organ
to
(pertaining
43-A
and
43
Articles
Law
The U.S. District Court found that New York courts historically have not
recognized a dead body as property in common law, 1 4 and that property
interests "only extend[] to preserving and burying the body." ' 1 5 Therefore,
the court found that it would be "against public policy to recognize broad
property rights in the body of a deceased" and "to engage in a valuation of
Mr. Colavito's kidneys, which are not property."' " 6 In addition, the court
noted the distinction between the Colavito case, which involved a third
party beneficiary, and those cases that only allowed the next of kin to
to
sustain a conversion claim." 7 Therefore, the court found it improper
8
expand the minimal cadaveric rights recognized by other courts."
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the lower
court's interpretation on the claim for conversion on two grounds. First, the
Second Circuit reasoned that "there is by no means a modem consensus that
body parts are excluded from conversion actions at common law."'" 19 The
Second Circuit cited Cornelio v. Stamford Hospital, which noted that the
existence of property rights in body parts is a "'new, and thorny, question'
that 'has as yet been the subject of very little authority and
commentary."" 120 Second, the Second Circuit concluded that Colavito
109.
110.

Id. at 218.
Id.

111.

Colavito, 438 F.3d at 218.

112.

Id.

113. Id. at 216. "The donors, the Lucia family, have also brought suit against a variety
of persons and entities in New York State court alleging fraud, battery, conversion, and
violation of N. Y Public Health Law Article 43. See Lucia v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network,
Inc., No. 03-012981 (Supreme Ct. Nassau Co.)." Id. at 216 n. 1.
114. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 237, 242 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (citation omitted).
115. Id. at243.
116. Id. at 244, 246.
117. Id. at 244 n.9.
118. Id. at244.
119. Colavito, 438 F.3d at 224.
120. Id. at 224 (quoting Cornelio v. Stamford Hosp., 717 A.2d 140, 143 n.6 (Conn.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2008

17

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 17 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 4

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 17

could maintain a cause of action because as a human organ recipient, the
suit was not brought for control of the body and its parts, but rather, for the
deprivation of a working organ. 12 1 In short, the Second Circuit argued that
plaintiffs, such as Colavito, are not creating a "legal fiction,"
but have real
' 22
legal claims based on the "loss of a functioning organ."'
Regrettably, in its resolution of the Colavito appeal, the New York Court
of Appeals adhered to the common law rule that no one can have a property
right in a dead body. 123 The court commented that "a next of kin has only a
right to possess the body only for the purposes of burying it, and a
corresponding duty to do so.''124 Even though the court recognized "that the
'no property right' jurisprudence was developed long before the age of
transplants and other medical advances," it refused to identify or forecast
the circumstances in which someone may conceivably
have actionable
25
person.
deceased
a
of
organ
or
body
the
in
rights
E. A Needfor Legislative Action
The Colavito decision represents a standstill in the law and highlights the
need for legislatures to finally recognize a property interest in the body of a
decedent. The expansion of property rights in the body of a human
decedent would not only be a step closer towards resolving the organ
shortage, but it would also protect the donors and donees of cadaveric
organs for transplantation as they are presently without legal recourse under
a claim for conversion.
Currently, the State of Ohio is one of only three states to acknowledge
that property rights are the basis for the next of kin's entitlement to donate
an organ.126 In contrast to current case law, 12 7 Ohio's anatomical gift laws
suggest "either that a donor has a property right to her organs prior to her
demise transferable to the donee upon the execution of the statutorily
approved instruments or upon death or that the newly created donee's
property right to the donated organ springs out of nowhere."'128 In short, the
donor has a property right to his or her organs before death, which transfers
1998).
121. Id. at 225. The court argued that the consent form directing a donation to Colavito
would meet the standard under N.Y. Jur. Contracts § 302. Id. at 228 n.14.
122. Id. at 225.
123. Colavito, 860 N.E.2d at 718 (citing Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N.Y. 574, 583
(1875)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 719.
126. Stickney, supra note 61 at 38 (discussing Ohio Senate Bill 188: Ohio's New
Anatomical Gift Law enacted December 13, 2000).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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to the next of kin, or donee, upon the execution of the statutorily approved
instruments or upon death. The State of Ohio hopes that "[b]y recognizing
the supremacy of a donor/testator's right to bequeath her organs and
subsequently deterring family from contesting a decedent's designation, the
new statute may alleviate ... the overwhelming shortage of transplantable
,,129
organs ....
This is certainly a move in the right direction, but until federal and state
legislatures follow suit and begin to expand the scope of property rights in
the human body, the issue of whether a property interest exists in the organs
and tissues of the decedent will continue to arise in courtrooms across the
country. So, why do the legislatures around the country refuse to recognize
a vested property right to protect the donors or donees and provide legal
recourse when their rights have been violated by acts of fraud and
conversion? Also, why do the legislatures refuse to allow parties to
contract for the harvesting of organs upon the decedent's death, when the
only true public health concern of promoting life no longer applies because
the individual is deceased? The answers to these questions are not based on
property law or public health concerns, but on the regulatory and moral
issues concerning the commodification of the human body.
IV. MARKET-BASED APPROACH

A. "Body Property": Commodifying the Human Body
"While the body may once have lacked the commercial characteristics
often associated with property, changing circumstances are emphasizing
these very characteristics."' 130 One commentator has argued that "the very
existence of a law forbidding commercial alienation of organs paradoxically
portrays the human body as an 'article of commerce' that lies within the
power and would otherwise be subject to sale on
purview of congressional
131
the market.'
In his book, Body Parts: Property Rights and the Ownership of Human
Biological Materials,E. Richard Gold attempts to forecast what is likely to
occur if our society recognizes human biological materials as commodities
by examining case law to determine the bases upon which courts balance
and award property rights. 132 He argues that "courts are likely to award
property rights if to do so will enhance such trade"; however, "[i]f... the
129.
130.
131.
(2000).
132.

Id.
Jaffe, supra note 67, at 555.
Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L.REv 359, 376
GOLD, supra note 96.
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allocation of property rights... hinder[s] trade in the good, the court is
unlikely to award a property right."'' 33 However, if the courts look
primarily to a good's economic value in determining whether to attach
property rights to that good, 134 then why do the courts fail to consider that
organs are already being bought and sold on the black-market, as a result of
the shortage of available organs? Thus, it seems unwarranted to assume
that organs do not have a commercial value recognizable of such a property
interest.
The truth is that granting an individual, or the next of kin, property rights
in cadaveric organs would be a step toward opening the door to the sale of
the human body, and this concept arguably "offends common notions of
' 35 Cohen states:
decency."'
Human beings... are of incomparable ethical worth and admit of no
equivalent. Each has value that is beyond the contingencies of supply
and demand or of any other relative estimation. They are priceless.
Consequently, to sell an integral human body part is to corrupt the very
meaning of human dignity.i36
These views are reflective of the raw sentiments held by many regarding the
commercialization, trade, or sale of the human body.' 37 However, Gregory
Crespi notes that in enacting the prohibition on the sale of organs,
"Congress appears to have assumed without reflection that allowing any
form of compensation to be paid to organ donors would violate fundamental
social norms. There was no attempt made to examine alternative regulatory
frameworks that might harness financial incentives to enhance organ
' 38
availability without transgressing those norms."'
In truth, offering compensation for organs will not necessarily lead to
exploitation--on the contrary, it may be regarded as necessary to minimize
39
the level of inequities that exists in current organ procurement systems.'
Furthermore, "[a] market in body parts and products [is needed] ... to
ensure that patients are protected from coercion and given the chance to be
paid fairly for their contributions."' 140
Therefore, federal and state
133. Id. at 44.
134.

Id.

135. L.D. de Castro, Commodification and Exploitation: Arguments in Favour of
Compensated Organ Donation, 29 J.MED. ETHICS 142, 142 (2003).
136. Cynthia Cohen, Selling Bits and Pieces of Humans to Make Babies: The Gift of the
Magi Revisited, 24 J. MED. & PHIL. 288, 292 (1999).
137. See de Castro, supra note 135, at 142.
138. Crespi, supra note 16, at 15.
139. See supra Section II Part C.
140.

Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28, 28 (Oct.

1986)
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legislatures need to reconsider policies banning the sale of human cadaveric
organs, and permit a commercial market in organs to resolve the shortage.
B. The Organ Market
The government recognized that organs were of such value to the public
health that it founded an interstate network to regulate and ensure the
procurement of organs. 14 1 In doing so, the federal government assumed a
responsibility for increasing the organ supply by regulating the practice of
organ donation. Unfortunately, the altruistic nature of the government's
system is failing, and has been for several decades. Thus, a new stand
needs to be taken to resolve this shortage.
In a commercial market for organs, the human body would not be
reduced to mere property, but would be recognized as such in a legal
context to ensure the protection of the individual rights in one's own body.
In fact, the guiding principle behind the policy of recognizing a property
interest in the human body is that "individuals 'own' their bodies as a
'possession,' and that only individuals can weigh the risks versus benefits,
the pains versus pleasures, entailed in deciding whether to keep, sell, or be
buried with one's organs."'142 This comment asserts that removing the
prohibitions on the sale of organs can be accomplished while still respecting
the ethical considerations associated with recognizing the integrity and
dignity in the human body, and more importantly, can provide the
incentives needed to increase organ supplies.
A market-based approach presents alternatives to operating in an organs
market: (1) an "Open Market" 143 (absolute market system) or (2) a "Futures
Market."' 144 The primary goal of each alternative is to increase the organ
supply and expand autonomy over one's body. 45 Furthermore, either
approach permits the sale of organs by individuals before death or by
surviving family members after death.146 However, there are numerous
distinctions between the two market-based approaches which suggest that
the futures market would be the most in line with current law and ethics.
First, the open-market system is a policy of "unrestricted autonomy,
which would allow individuals to enter into any contracts they wish for the
buying-and-selling of their organs."' 147 Such a policy would include, on its
own principles, the right to sell vital organs while alive. Second, financial
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

42 U.S.C. § 274 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
President's Council on Bioethics, supra note 9.
See Goodwin, supra note 64, at 318.
See Crespi, supra note 16, at 6.
President's Council on Bioethics, supra note 9.
Id.
Id.
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compensation for cadaveric donation and financial compensation for living
donation are different ideas and it is quite possible to have one without the
other. Third, the concept of an open market does not appropriately consider
the ethical and public health concerns surrounding the promotion of life.
Fourth, the primary focus of the practice of medicine is care and
beneficence, which would preclude physicians from engaging in any
activity that would harm the patient, especially removing vital organs from
a living human. 148 Therefore, practical limitations on the recognition of a
property interest in the living body are necessary and an open market
approach would not be in line with the current law and ethics.
C. The "FuturesMarket" in Human Cadavers
A futures market in cadaveric organs "would allow individuals before
death, or surviving family members after death," to respectively sell the
decedent's organs in a private contract. 149 There are several proposals set
forth in this market approach including (1) benefits to the individual in
life 50 or (2) benefits to the deceased's estate.' 5 ' Specifically, scholar Henry
Hansmann proposes a future market where health insurance companies
would purchase the future rights to procure the policyholder's
transplantable organs upon the policyholder's death. 52 The policy-holder,
in return, would receive a deduction on the insurance premium paid for that
term. 153 The insurance company would then input the individual's name
into a national registry, which the hospitals could access to find a suitable
recipient through a national matching network linked to the registry.15 The
insurance company would receive payment from the recipient under a
specified price for an organ upon accepting it for transplant. 155 The natural
market forces of supply and demand could determine the price of the
harvested organ, or the government could establish the price. 11 6 Of course,
such a system would protect individual autonomy by permitting the policy

148.
RPT.

See James S. Childress, The Place ofAutonomy in Bioethics, 20

HASTINGS CENTER

12, 15 (Jan. 1990).

149. President's Council on Bioethics, supra note 9 (describes a spot market with
surviving family members selling the decedent's organs). See HENRY HANSMANN, Markets
for Human Organs, in A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR BIOETHICS 145, 147 (Cosimo Marco
Mazzoni ed., Kluwer Law International 1998).
150. HANSMANN, supra note 149, at 147.
151. Crespi, supra note 16, at 35.
152. HANSMANN, supra note 149, at 147.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 147-48.
155. Idat 148.
156. Id.
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holder the freedom
to change the agreement every time the policy came up
57
1
renewal.
for
Lloyd Cohen argues that such a system is "unnecessary and undesirable"
because of the loss of individual autonomy. Rather, he proposes "a system
of renewable, annual organ procurement contracts."'' 58 In construct,
remuneration would be paid to the decedent's estate upon the death of the
organ provider in accordance with the execution of contingent or option
contracts. 59 An options market in organs would of course allow firms to
buy the rights to organs in the event of the donor's death. This comment
agrees that the approach Cohen presents is most in line with the notions of
individual autonomy and the right to choose, and therefore, would be the
most appropriate choice for a futures market approach.
This comment also supports a futures market approach to redress organ
shortage in America because it is consistent with practices in public health
law concerned with the promotion of life for living donors. However, this
comment does concede that it seems illogical to refuse an autonomous
individual the right to sell non-vital body parts in life on an open market,
while living organ donation is already permissible for non-vital organs and
tissues. Is it not true that the government grants the living donor the
property interest to donate a non-vital organ or tissue on the assumption that
the living donor is able to balance the benefits and risks associated with
such a donation? Thus, it seems that the same balance could be
appropriately considered when electing to buy or sell organs for
transplantation, and the relationship between autonomy and beneficence in
contemporary bioethics could be maintained.
D. Changing the Law to Allow a FuturesMarket to Operate
This policy change will not occur in a judicial venue because even those
judges who accept all of the policy arguments in favor of allowing
commercialization will have great difficulty interpreting a clear statutory
prohibition to mean the opposite.160 However, the foundation for modem
state law on organ transplantation in most jurisdictions is the 1968 version
of the UAGA, which does not include provisions regarding the matter of

HANSMANN, supra note 149, at 147.
158. Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's Most
Vulnerable Participantsin a Commercialized Organ TransplantationSystem, 21 AM. J. L. &
157.

MED. 45, 80 (1995) (citing Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for
Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 57 (1989)).

159.

Id. (citing Schwindt & Vining, Future Market for Organs, 11 J. HEALTH POL.

POL'Y & L. 483 (1987)).
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Crespi, supra note 16, at 55.
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organ sales. 16 1 Considering the central focus of the UAGA was to facilitate
organ transplantation, some argue that the absence of an express provision
may provide a door for courts to exercise their discretion. 162 This comment
has proposed forceful arguments that a futures market could more
effectively achieve that objective than does the existing system.
Furthermore, "[s]uch a construction could be accompanied by judicial
endorsement of the concept of property rights in body parts," which more
and more bodies of legal authority are supporting.163 This would
"remove... the state law obstacles to the operation of a futures market in
the significant number of states that have statutory frameworks based upon
the 1968 UAGA and that have' 64not adopted express prohibitions against
commercial organ transactions.
Nonetheless, commentators contend:
Such rulings, however, would not reach the state law restrictions in the
fourteen states that have adopted the 1987 version of the UAGA with its
express prohibition on organ sales, nor to the restrictions existing in those
states that have augmented their 1968 UAGA-based statutes with express
prohibitions. More importantly, they would not address the prohibition
imposed by NOTA barring any organ sale transactions that involve the
instrumentality of interstate commerce. 165
However, there is a plausible textual argument that can be made
concerning the "valuable consideration" definition found in NOTA. As a
counter to the argument that the legislative history of NOTA evidences
congressional intent to prohibit organ sales, 166 commentators suggest that:
[T]he "reasonable payments" language should be construed to not include
compensation paid to donors for their organs, [as] one can argue that the
legislative history evidences even more clearly the legislative intent to
alleviate the organ shortage, and that all textual ambiguities should be
resolved in
a manner that furthers achievement of this primary
67
objective.'
Nevertheless, commentators also note that it "appears that the governing
statutes can not reasonably bear a favorable reinterpretation that would
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 56.
164. Crespi, supra note 16, at 56.
165. Id.
166. The Senate Report on NOTA merely stated: "It is the sense of the Committee that
individuals or organizations should not profit by the sale of human organs for
transplantation," and "human body parts should not be viewed as commodities." S. REP. No.
98-382, 98th Cong. at 16, as reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3982.
167. See Crespi, supra note 16, at 57-58.
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allow a futures market to operate, and that a complete overhaul of NOTA
and the UAGA will be required."'' 68 Of course, none of the legislation
needed for this program is already in place or pending. The government
would need to regulate the market-based approach for public health reasons,
as previously explained, to uphold the prohibition on the sale of vital
organs from living donors. However, once organs and tissues are
recognized as property, federal and state regulations on commercial
transactions could police the market influences, and the current criminal
statutes, currently established to face the black market forces, would police
any malicious conduct.
V.

FACING THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

Ethicists have long debated the rightful authority over the dead and the
morally correct way to impose this right. The concept of a futures market
for organ procurement raises legal and ethical implications centering on the
exploitation of the poor, 169 the fear that allowing commercial sales would
undermine altruism, 70 and third-party influences.' 7 ' However, proper
analysis can dispel those concerns.
A. Deprivation and Exploitation of the Indigent
Those opposed to opening the market fear that doing so would make the
cost of organ transplantation so astronomical as to deprive the poor equal
access, and argue that it would be a fundamental injustice to deprive those
who would not financially be able to receive most organs. 172 However,
finance should not be an issue when a realistic reflection into current public
health care shows unequal access to transplantation because of monetary
coverage. 173 In addition, the government's increased involvement in organ
transplantation derives from the savings to the government health budget
associated with additional patients receiving organ transplants. 174 With the
advancements in biotechnology that preserve organs outside of the body,
and the pharmaceutical developments that dramatically improve the
survival rates of transplant recipients, the government hoped that the
168. Id. at 58.
169. Id. at 25 (citing Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs for
Transplantation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigation and Oversight of the
H.Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong. 269 (1983) (testimony of Oscar
Salvatierra, President of the American Society of Transplant Surgeons)).
170. Id.
171. Chandis, supra note 5, at 226.
172. Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs,supra note 169, at 276.
173. CAPLAN ET AL, supra note 27, at 238.
174. S. REP. NO. 98-382 (1984).
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increased cost of delivering these benefits would be more than offset by
savings from decreased use of long-term care. 175 Therefore, it seems
unlikely that the government would not continue to invest in organ
transplantation for dependents, rather than treat these individuals through
the costly medical
services provided by supplementary medical insurance
176
programs.
Additionally, the fear of exploiting those in need of money is more or
less latently counterintuitive because the laws banning the sale of organs
have helped fuel the black market for those organs. In particular,
prohibitions have fueled the black market for kidneys, in which the
desperation of dying patients whose only hope is to obtain an organ, drives
the illegal trade of organs from people who need money more than a second
kidney. British Professor Nadey Hakim, a transplant surgeon at St Mary's
Hospital in London, noted, "[t]he black market in organs can no longer be
ignored, and the risks of the unregulated trade in organs outweighed the
dangers of legalising it."' 177 In short, introducing governmental supervision
and funding will provide equity for the poor, who will get equal access to
organ transplants and whose families will benefit from the sale of their
organs upon death.
B. Notions ofAltruism
Another concern is that an organs market would eliminate the voluntary
donation of organs during life or upon death. 178 However, denying a
property interest in cadaveric organs will only promote the psychological
barriers to donor consent as the courts continue to refuse to grant legal
recourse for fraud and conversion claims against the current organ sharing
network. 79 Also, recognizing such a right will hopefully not automatically
remove the inherent nature of altruism and generosity amongst people in
society because "[i]t is only a certain type of person who will donate an
' 80
organ and another who will sell it.'

175. Id. "Nationwide, between 6,000 and 10,000 people are being maintained on either
hemodialysis or peritoneal dialysis while awaiting a kidney transplant." CAPLAN ET AL.,
supra note 27, at 143. Medicare would avoid direct dialysis costs, which routinely exceed
$55, 000 per patient, per year, for each patient transplanted. Organ Donation and Recovery
Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-216, 118 Stat. 584 (2004).
176. S. REP. No. 98-382 (Pub. L. No. 98-507, National Organ Transplant Act).
177. Jeremy Laurence, Legalise Organ Sales to Ease Severe Shortage, Says Transplant
Surgeon, INDEP. (London), October 6, 2006, at 24.
178. See Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs,supra note 169, at 270, 278-79.
179. See Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 860 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 2006).
180. Magda Slabbert, Commercializationof Human Organsfor Transplantation:A View
from South Africa, 24 MED. & L. 191, 198 (2005).
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C. Third PartyInfluences
The commodification of cadaveric organs opens the door to placing a
price tag on a person's body parts. It is not improbable to consider that in
desperate times a person or his family may need money so badly that an
individual would commit suicide, or be killed by another, for the anticipated
sale price. These potential situations are disheartening to say the least.
However, the intentional infliction of harm upon another person is
specifically addressed by criminal and civil statutes, which prohibit and
punish such conduct. These protections are already in place to regulate this
type of conduct, and therefore, such potential conduct should not deter the
recognition of a market-based approach.
VI. CONCLUSION

The current legal and institutional framework governing the
transplantation of human bodily organs is ineffective. "Patients who die
waiting for a transplant do so not because of a shortage produced by natural
limits or human indifference, but rather due to an inefficiency of existing
organ procurement policies."' 81 It is well understood that a change in social
norms must precede a change in the legal rule, but the legislature has the
potential to save lives and lessen suffering. The initial legislative intent was
to alleviate the organ shortage in America, and this national crisis should be
resolved in a manner that furthers achievement of this primary objective.
Any revised procurement scheme will be met by controversy and
skepticism.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the system needs
transformation. The federal government has assumed responsibility for
increasing the organ supply by regulating the practice of organ donation.
To maintain the status quo or to adopt a presumed consent policy are both
morally unacceptable. Allowing donor compensation would protect the
dignity of donors and would reduce the suffering and death of the many
people waiting for transplant organs.
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